theory for conceptualizing the fundamental difference between QumranSadducean and Pharisaic-rabbinic law.' Previous studies generally sufficed with the vague characterization of Qumran law as "priestly" without defining exactly what this means or how it relates to specific legal issues. Schwartz, in contrast, examines numerous particular disputes between these two legal systems and explains how they devolve from two conflicting understandings of law. The rabbis were legal nominalists while the Qumran-Sadducean exegetes were legal realists, defined as follows:
From a systematic point of view, the contrast between the nominalist and realist trends is bound up with the contrast in principle concerning the actual nature of the link between God and the laws of the Torah-the contrast between a view of the commandments as orders resultant from the will of the commanding God, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a view of the commandments as guidelines based in independently existing situations, which man, due to the grace of the wisdom-giving God, may introduce among his considerations by accepting the yoke of the commandments.' by explaining how realism makes sense in a priestly worldview whereas nominalism better fits the situation of rabbis and sages. This insightful argument has gained a following at academic conferences and has been adopted by other scholars.3 All who share an interest in ancient Jewish law should appreciate this contribution to the field.
However, like many innovative perspectives, Schwartz's position is somewhat overstated. In the following discussion I make three general arguments. First, I present some considerations which militate against classifying rabbinic law as nominalist, and hence against seeing nominalism versus realism as the fundamental dispute between the rabbis and Qumran. Second, I argue that the specific legal disputes Schwartz analyzes fail to unequivocally support his conclusions. Finally, I will suggest some modifications to Schwartz's theory. I hope that my engagement with Schwartz's ideas will contribute to a deeper understanding of the two systems of law. 
